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Transferable Development Rights
Programs
“POST-ZONING”?
Vicki Been & John Infranca†
INTRODUCTION
Once described as “the quirkiest and most invisible
place in all of New York City,”1 the High Line—an elevated
railroad track that originally ferried animals to the city’s
meatpacking district—is now a celebrated urban park. It is also
the centerpiece of the Special West Chelsea District, a rezoning
that
dramatically
altered
the
neighborhood’s
built
environment, enabling the transformation of warehouses and
meat processing plants into high-end residential and
commercial spaces.2 This transformation was achieved in part
through the use of transferable development rights (TDRs). A
sophisticated TDR program allowed owners of property
beneath the railway, who were prevented from building
†

Vicki Been, Boxer Family Professor of Law and Director, Furman Center
for Real Estate and Urban Policy, New York University School of Law. John Infranca,
Jonathan L. Mechanic/Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson Fellow at the Furman
Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, New York University School of Law. The
authors wish to thank Rohan Jolly and Gabriel Panek for excellent research assistance,
Adam Eckstein and Alex Derian for preparing our figures, Josiah Madar for his tireless
work on our broader TDR research project, the participants in the Furman Center
Brown Bag lunch series for suggestions and provocative questions about TDRs, the
staff of the Brooklyn Law Review for their careful editing, and the members of the
Furman Center’s TDR advisory committee: Robert Von Ancken, Joshua Bloodworth,
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1
Kenneth T. Jackson, From Rail to Ruin?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, at 4.11,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/02/opinion/from-rail-to-ruin.html (“A
concrete and steel structure two stories above the sidewalk, it is so big that anyone can see
it, but so nondescript and so much a part of the urban landscape that it mostly goes
unnoticed.”). For a brief history of the High Line see Meera Subramanian, City Lore, Blasts
from the Past, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, at 4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/02/05/nyregion/thecity/05high.html.
2
See infra notes 65-89 and accompanying text.
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upward, to transfer some of their unused development rights to
other sites in the district where development was favored.3
New York City’s Zoning Resolution, like most zoning
codes, places restrictions on the number of square feet of floor
area a developer can construct on an individual property lot.4 In
certain circumstances, the zoning code permits landowners to
transfer unused development capacity from their lot to another
parcel of land, effectively increasing the size of what can be
built at the receiving site.5 A granting parcel might be
developed below its maximum capacity for a number of
reasons: because of a separate regulatory restriction, such as a
historic preservation ordinance; because the owner has chosen
not to develop to the full permitted capacity; or because a
zoning change has given the owner some unused development
rights, but not enough to justify redeveloping the site. TDR
programs allow property owners to recoup some of the value of
unused capacity on their lots through a sale of the unused
development rights on the private market.6
A number of transfer programs exist in New York City.
These include zoning lot mergers, which permit transfers as of
right (without the requirement of any review or approval
process) but only between adjacent properties; landmark
transfers, which allow transfers across a street or intersection,
subject to certain restrictions and approvals; and a number of
special district transfer programs, which allow transfers from
specified granting zones or sites to specified receiving zones,
usually within the same neighborhood.7 TDRs in New York City
originally served two central purposes: first, they allowed greater
flexibility through a zoning lot merger process that operates akin

3

See infra notes 65-89 and accompanying text (discussing Special West
Chelsea District TDR program).
4
See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, ZONING HANDBOOK 148 (2011)
[hereinafter ZONING HANDBOOK] (“The floor area ratio is the principal bulk regulation
controlling the size of buildings. FAR is the ratio of total building floor area to the area
of its zoning lot.”).
5
See David E. Mills, Transferable Development Rights Markets, 7 J. URB.
ECON. 63, 63-64 (1980).
6
See id. at 64 (“[T]he attractiveness of TDR is held to be the equitable
treatment it affords landowners. Specifically, it avoids arbitrary rationing of gains from
development associated with direct controls. [T]DRs are assigned on some equitable
basis and the land market (working within the constraint of whatever direct controls
may remain) determines the most efficient use for every parcel.”).
7
See infra Part I (discussing history and regulatory structure of New York
City’s TDR programs).
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to density zoning, and second, they offset the burdens imposed on
property owners by landmark preservation regulations.8
TDR programs recently have been used in New York
City, particularly in the Special West Chelsea District and the
Special Hudson Yards District, to control the location and
intensity of new development by carefully designating the
subdistricts authorized to receive TDRs under various rules.9
Similarly, the Bloomberg administration’s recent proposal to
rezone East Midtown would allow developers to purchase
unused development rights above Grand Central Terminal, a
landmarked building. Those unused development rights have
remained unused (for want of a market) since the Supreme
Court upheld New York City’s Landmark Preservation Act, and
first confronted the concept of TDRs in 1978.10 The proposed
East Midtown rezoning could, in theory, create towers that
would rival the Empire State Building. As it is currently
structured, however, the proposal would only allow transfers of
development rights from Grand Central Terminal and other
landmarks to specific sites where the city wants to encourage
more intense development.11
TDR programs with a range of structures12 and purposes
exist throughout the United States and internationally.13 TDR
8

See infra Parts I.A (discussing zoning lot mergers) and I.B (discussing
landmark TDR program). For a definition of “density zoning” see infra note 112 and
accompanying text.
9
TDRs have been used to serve a variety of preservation goals. The New
York State statute that empowers cities to adopt a TDR program states:
The purpose of providing for transfer of development rights shall be to protect
the natural, scenic or agricultural qualities of open lands, to enhance sites
and areas of special character or special historical, cultural, aesthetic or
economic interest or value and to enable and encourage flexibility of design
and careful management of land in recognition of land as a basic and
valuable natural resource.
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-f(2) (McKinney 2012).
10
See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (discussing proposed East
Midtown rezoning).
11
For preliminary reports on the plan, which is still a work in progress as this
article went to press, see, for example, Theresa Agovino, City Hall: Supersize Midtown’s East
Side, 28 CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. 3 (July 8, 2012), available at http://www.crainsnewyork.com/
article/20120708/REAL_ESTATE/307089970; Matt Chaban, Faulty Towers: Midtown
Needs a Makeover, with Twice as Tall Towers, but Can Mayor Bloomberg Get it Right?,
N.Y. OBSERVER (June 27, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://observer.com/2012/06/faulty-towersmidtown-needs-a-makeover-but-can-the-bloomberg-administration-get-it-right/?show=all.
12
TDR programs differ in how they permit unused capacity at a granting site
to be transferred and converted into more intense development at a receiving site.
Some programs convert the preservation of, for example, a certain number of acres of
farmland into a defined number of development credits. These credits allow for a
specified amount of additional density at the receiving site, for instance, one additional
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programs outside New York City serve various (and sometimes
multiple) purposes, including the preservation of historic sites,
farmland, and environmentally sensitive land; the development
of affordable housing; and broader urban design and
revitalization goals.14 As in New York City, these programs
have become increasingly sophisticated over time, introducing
new techniques to confront local needs.15
In this essay, we look primarily at how transferable
development rights programs in New York City—particularly
in the Special West Chelsea District, the Hudson Yards District,
and the proposed East Midtown rezoning—are being substituted
for the upzonings, density bonuses, and other flexibility devices
the city has traditionally used to enable added density in a
particular area. These newer programs make TDRs more
flexible in some ways, but they also mark a shift away from the
density zoning reflected in zoning lot mergers, landmark
transfers, and earlier transfer district concepts.
We begin, in Part I, by reviewing the basic design of
New York City’s transferable development rights programs. We
specifically consider the increasing sophistication of these
programs and their practice of carefully designating potential
receiving parcels for the purpose of furthering discrete land use
residential unit for ten acres of preserved farmland. See ARTHUR C. NELSON ET AL., THE
TDR HANDBOOK 3 (2012). In New York City, the transfer of development rights occur
on a one-to-one basis, with transfers taking the form of a specific number of square feet
of floor area. See, e.g., Norman Marcus, Air Rights in New York City: TDR, Zoning Lot
Merger and the Well-Considered Plan, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 867, 879 (1984) (“To arrive at
the amount of transferable floor area, the floor area of the existing landmark building
is subtracted from the floor area that would be allowable if the lot were vacant. Any
floor area transferred is irrevocably subtracted from the development potential of the
landmark site.”).
13
See NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, 131 (identifying 239 communities in the
United States with TDR programs); Rick Pruetz & Erica Pruetz, Transfer of
Development Rights Turns 40, 59 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3, 3 (2007) (“We know of 181 TDR
programs in 33 states that have preserved at least 300,000 acres of farmland, natural
areas, and open space to date.”).
14
See NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 131-227 (cataloguing and discussing
TDR programs by purpose); see also MARGARET WALLS & VIRGINIA MCCONNELL,
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS IN U.S.
COMMUNITIES (2007), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/News/Features/upload/
30347_1.pdf (discussing ten primarily rural and suburban examples of TDR programs).
Notable TDR programs outside New York City include Montgomery County,
Maryland’s farmland preservation program, and New Jersey’s Pinelands program.
Pruetz & Pruetz, supra note 13, at 4; see also Sarah J. Stevenson, Note, Banking on
TDRs: The Government’s Role as Banker of Transferable Development Rights, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1329, 1347-58 (1998) (discussing TDR programs in New Jersey,
Montgomery County, and Seattle).
15
See NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 236-40 (same); Pruetz & Pruetz, supra
note 13, at 7-9 (discussing new TDR techniques).
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goals. We also look closely at the regulatory structure of the
West Chelsea TDR program and at the transfers that have
occurred since its inception. We then briefly review the recently
adopted Hudson Yards TDR Program and the Bloomberg
administration’s latest proposal to use TDRs in a rezoning of
the area surrounding Grand Central Terminal. In Part II, we
discuss the conceptual frameworks that legal scholars
developed in crafting the TDR programs New York City and
many other jurisdictions across the nation have adopted. With
those frameworks in mind, in Part III we consider how New
York City’s TDR programs have shifted toward using TDRs as
a tool to channel development in service of the city’s goals,
rather than as a flexibility device for property owners. Finally,
we consider some of the implications of this shift, arguing that
it brings various advantages even while it reduces flexibility.
While the definition of “post-zoning” remains a work in
progress, TDRs, given their close relationship with traditional
elements of zoning, are unlikely to qualify under any definition
of the term. For instance, TDRs derive their structure from
many basic components of zoning, including floor area ratio
and the definition of a zoning lot. Indeed, in reviewing the
creation of New York City’s Theater Subdistrict, Norman
Marcus—one of the earliest proponents of TDRs and the chief
legal counsel of New York’s City Planning Commission—sought
to place the concept “within the framework of traditional
zoning principles.”16 At the same time, however, the early
conception of TDR districts as a form of density zoning gave
TDRs promise as a flexible, market-oriented tool that would
cap the total density within a district while allowing
landowners within the district to decide how to allocate it.
The more recent programs give developers who want to
use TDRs a greater ability to break out of existing zoning
constraints and, therefore, to some extent, move TDRs beyond
traditional zoning. But these programs fall considerably short
of density zoning and lack the flexibility required to qualify as
“post-zoning.” Instead, these newer programs are marked by
16

Michael Kruse, Constructing the Special Theater Subdistrict: Culture,
Politics, and Economics in the Creation of Transferable Development Rights, 40 URB.
LAW. 95, 137-39 (2008); see also id. at 130 (“TDRs have been seen as inconsistent with
traditional principles of zoning and land use regulation.”); Andrew J. Miller,
Transferable Development Rights in the Constitutional Landscape: Has Penn Central
Failed to Weather the Storm?, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 459, 510 (1999) (“[TDRs] are a
flexible market-based tool that can help land planners overcome many of the
shortcomings associated with traditional zoning practices.”).
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three important and interrelated features: first, they use
complex subdistricting designations to determine the location
of TDR recipient sites and the density permitted on those sites;
second, they use TDRs as one component of a comprehensive
rezoning and redevelopment plan; and third, they use
additional regulations and incentives to strengthen the market
for these TDRs. In sum, these newer programs enable more
creative uses of TDRs and more distant transfers, but they
accomplish these results through complex regulations that
render TDRs less a mechanism to alleviate zoning’s rigidity than
simply another tool in service of traditional zoning principles.
I.

TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAMS IN
NEW YORK CITY

In this first part, we review the purposes and regulatory
structure of New York City’s various TDR programs and
highlight crucial distinctions between the programs. This
review sets the stage for Parts II and III, where we consider
how these different programs’ features relate to early
scholarship on TDRs and how they might move TDRs into the
realm of “post-zoning.”
A.

The Zoning Lot Merger

The “zoning lot merger” is the “simplest example of
transferable development rights” in New York City.17 The
zoning lot is the unit that the city uses to determine a
structure’s compliance with applicable zoning requirements.
Often, but not always, a zoning lot is identical in size and
location to a tax lot, the principal unit of property ownership.18
Through a zoning lot merger, the owners of separate tax lots
may merge these lots—for zoning-compliance purposes only—
into a single zoning lot.19 In doing so, these private owners alter
the unit of zoning control and create a merged zoning lot within
which they can freely transfer bulk and density between their
tax lots.20 Buildings remain subject to regulations governing
17

Marcus, supra note 12, at 870.
According to the New York City Zoning Handbook, a tax lot “is a parcel of
land identified with a unique borough, block and lot number for property tax purposes.”
A zoning lot “is a tract of land comprising a single tax lot or two or more adjacent tax
lots within a block . . . . [t]he zoning lot is the basic unit for zoning regulations . . . .”
ZONING HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 149, 156.
19
Marcus, supra note 12, at 875-76.
20
Id.
18
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height, setbacks, and other considerations. Ownership—and its
attendant rights and duties unrelated to zoning—remains a
function of the tax lots.
The city’s Zoning Resolution uses floor area ratio (FAR)
as the primary land use control. FAR “is the ratio of total
building floor area to the area of its zoning lot” and determines
a building’s maximum bulk.21 For example, a building on a
10,000-square-foot zoning lot, in a zoning district with a
maximum FAR of five, cannot exceed 50,000 square feet of floor
area. Figure 1 demonstrates two possible configurations for
this lot. If the building covered the entire zoning lot, it could
only be five stories high.22 But, if it covered only half the lot, the
building could rise to ten stories (as long as there are no
separate height controls). If a zoning lot is coterminous with
the owner’s tax lot, the FAR must be used on the tax lot. When
two zoning lots coterminous with two different tax lots are
merged to become one zoning lot, however, the parties are able
to transfer unused FAR between tax lots in the form of a
specific number of square feet of development rights.

21

ZONING HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 148. FAR was first developed in New
York City in 1940 but initially only applied to low-density areas of the city. Note,
Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338, 346 (1972)
[hereinafter Development Rights]. The real estate industry initially objected to this new
bulk restriction. Id. at 347. To gain their support, the 1961 resolution included two
additional changes to offset the effect of the new FAR regulations: first, the availability
of a bonus of twenty percent of a building’s FAR in exchange for adding a plaza to the
development, and second, a redefinition of the “zoning lot” to which the FAR would
apply. Id. at 347-48. The new definition of a zoning lot included any other parcel owned
by a developer within the same city block. Id. This new definition, by applying the FAR
limit to the entire zoning lot, allowed for the transfer of bulk from underdeveloped
buildings to a new development, creating the zoning lot merger. Id. at 348.
22
ZONING HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 148.
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Figure 1: FAR Example

When the current Zoning Resolution was introduced in
1961, it did not include a specific mechanism for transferring
development rights. But the definition of “zoning lot” permitted
a developer to enter into a long-term lease of contiguous tax
lots on the same city block and then purchase and shift unused
development rights from one tax lot to another.23 A long-term
lease had to be at least fifty years in duration, with an option to
renew that created a total lease of at least seventy-five years.24
But the seventy-five-year lease posed potential problems, for
example, if the lease terminated because a lessee ceased paying
the rent or the lessor was foreclosed upon.25 These situations
created uncertainties around the continued use of development
rights. To alleviate these concerns, a 1977 amendment to the
Zoning Resolution eliminated the lease requirement.26
Accordingly, the definition of “zoning lot” now includes a tract
of land consisting of two or more contiguous tax lots located on
23

Kruse, supra note 16, at 101; Marcus, supra note 12, at 873-74.
Marcus, supra note 12, at 873-74 (citing N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING
RESOLUTION § 12-10 (1961)).
25
Id. at 874.
26
David Alan Richards, Downtown Growth Control Through Development
Rights Transfer, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 435, 468-70 (1986) (discussing
additional concerns that motivated amendment).
24
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a single block, which, at the time of filing for a building permit
or certificate of occupancy, is treated as one zoning lot for
purposes of compliance with the Zoning Resolution.27
B.

Landmark Transfers

New York City introduced a development rights transfer
program for designated landmarks in 1968.28 The program
sought to compensate landmark property owners for financial
losses incurred due to the restrictions imposed by the city’s new
Landmark Preservation Law.29 It also provided the city with a
way to protect landmarks and restrict redevelopment without
paying compensation—an issue of particular concern given
Manhattan’s high land values.30 Under the program, landmark
owners may transfer unused development rights not only to
27

N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 12-10 (2012) (part (d) under definition
of Zoning Lot); see also Marc Israel & Caroline G. Harris, Higher and Higher, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 16, 2007, at 31 (discussing “basic mechanics of development rights deals”). In
certain zoning districts, the ability to use a zoning lot merger to increase building
height is restricted by the requirement that a tower occupy some percentage of the
merged zoning lot. See, e.g., N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-633(c)(3) (district R10X:
portion of tower above 85 feet must cover minimum of 33% of zoning lot); id. § 3524(d)(3) (district C4X); id. § 81-752(c)(1) (Eighth Avenue Corridor); id. § 82-36(a)(2)
(Special Lincoln Square District). These restrictions seek to prevent the construction of
buildings like the Trump World Tower, which obtained development rights from a
large number of merged zoning lots in order to build a tower that occupied “only 13
percent of the merged zoning lot.” David W. Dunlap, A Complex Plan’s Aim: Simpler
Zoning Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, at RE1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/
gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE4DF133CF933A05752C0A9669C8B63 (“Intended to curtail
the transfer of development rights, [the ‘packing the bulk’] rule is despised by
developers.”); David W. Dunlap, Battle Lines Drawn on New Zoning Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
June 4, 2000, at RE1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/04/realestate/battlelines-drawn-on-new-zoning-plan.html (“This [requirement] was intended to prevent the
harvesting of air rights up and down a block and piling them on a single building site,
as was done at Trump World Tower, which occupies only 13 percent of the merged
zoning lot.”).
28
The provisions governing landmark transfers are found at section 74-79 of
the New York City Zoning Resolution. See N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 74-79. Eligible
landmarks include Landmarks Preservation Commission designated landmarks.
except cemeteries, statues, monuments, bridges, or structures within historic districts.
An “adjacent [zoning] lot” eligible for receiving development rights from a landmark is
defined as one “contiguous to the lot occupied by the landmark . . . structure, . . . one
that is across a street and opposite to [such a] lot,” or, if the landmark structure is on a
corner lot, “one that fronts on the same street intersection as the lot occupied by the
landmark . . . .” Id. For lots in zoning districts C5-3, C5-5, C6-6, C6-7 or C6-9, an
adjacent lot can also mean “a lot contiguous or one that is across a street and opposite
another lot or lots that except for the intervention of streets or street intersections,
form a series extending to the lot occupied by the landmark . . . .” Id. In this case, all
such lots must be under common ownership. See id.
29
Kruse, supra note 16, at 102.
30
Norman Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking
Clause: The Case of Manhattan’s Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 77, 91-92 (1974).
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other lots on the same block but also to lots directly across a
street or, if the landmark is at a corner, to any of the other
corner lots at the same intersection.31 The ability to transfer
development rights beyond the same block came with a limit on
the receiving site’s ability to increase its existing FAR. Indeed,
as originally enacted, a receiving site’s FAR could only be
increased by twenty percent above the site’s maximum FAR
before the transfer.32
The owner of Grand Central Terminal challenged the
landmark law in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City.33 Penn Central, the terminal’s owner, alleged that the
landmark regulation constituted an uncompensated taking and
that its TDRs were inadequate to offset or compensate for the
restrictions the landmark rules imposed since no purchasers
existed under the then-existing transfer rules.34 To blunt this
claim, the Landmark Preservation Commission adopted two
amendments. The first permitted the transfer of TDRs to “any
site connected to the landmark through a chain of lots under
common ownership.”35 The second removed the twenty-percent
limit on the increase in FAR at a receiving site, but only for
sites in the highest-density commercial districts.36
Under Section 74-791 of the current Zoning Resolution,
the owners of both the landmark seeking to transfer development
rights and the potential receiving lot must submit an application
for a special permit in order to make the transfer.37 Zoning lot
mergers, by contrast, can be executed as of right.38 Moreover, the
31

Richards, supra note 26, at 447; Stevenson, supra note 14, at 1334-35
(“[The 1968] amendment was the first example of ‘beyond-the-block’ TDR use,
drastically changing the concept of, and traditional justifications for, TDRs.”).
32
Kruse, supra note 16, at 101 (citing N.Y.C. Planning Comm’n, Rep. CP20938, at 876 (1969)); Marcus, supra note 12, at 879 & n.45.
33
438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978).
34
Kruse, supra note 16, at 102.
35
Id.; see also Richards, supra note 26, at 451 (noting that amendment was
“announced October 7, 1969 (the same day the railroad’s suit was filed)”).
36
Richards, supra note 26, at 451. Richards notes that the original landmark
TDR program was introduced by a Planning Commission statement lauding, among its
benefits, the city’s ability to obtain “new tax revenues from what was previously
untaxable.” Id. at 448 (quoting N.Y.C. Planning Comm’n, Minutes 303 (May 1, 1968)).
He describes the 1969 amendment—which was introduced to allow broader transfers
from Grand Central and blunt the legal challenge—as “a classic case of spot zoning: an
amendment enacted solely for the benefit of one landowner which was not in
accordance with a comprehensive plan.” Id. at 451 (footnote omitted).
37
See N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 74-791 (2012).
38
See ZONING HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 146 (“A zoning lot merger is the
joining of two or more adjacent zoning lots into one new zoning lot. Unused
development rights may be shifted from one lot to another, as-of-right, only through a
zoning lot merger.”).
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special permit application is subject to New York City’s Uniform
Land Use Review Process (ULURP).39 Development rights
transfers from landmark sites may only be authorized upon the
City Planning Commission’s finding that the transfer
will not unduly increase the bulk of any development or enlargement,
density of population or intensity of use in any block to the detriment
of the occupants of buildings on the block or nearby blocks, and that
any disadvantages to the surrounding area . . . will be more than offset
by the advantages of the landmark’s preservation to the local
community and the City as a whole[.]40

Separate provisions in the Zoning Resolution provide additional
regulations that apply to landmarks in designated areas of the
city.41
The “procedures for obtaining approval of a proposed
[landmark] transfer are complex[,]” to put it mildly.42 In an
article published just four years after the institution of the
landmark transfer program, Professor John Costonis argued
that a number of the program’s characteristics reduce its
effectiveness as a preservation technique.43 In particular, the
zoning lot merger provision, which allows transfers as of right,
39

See id. at 157 (“The Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP) is the
public review process, mandated by the City Charter, for all proposed zoning map
amendments, special permits and other actions such as site selections and acquisitions
for city capital projects and disposition of city property.” (emphasis added)).
40
N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 74-792(e)(1). The City Planning Commission
also must find that the program proposed in the transfer application for continuous
maintenance of the landmark will indeed result in its preservation. Id. § 74-792(e)(2).
If a government entity (city, state, or federal) owns the landmark, the special permit
application must include a plan to provide a major improvement to the area’s
pedestrian circulation or transportation system. Id. § 74-792(e)(3). This requirement
serves as an exaction levied by the government “upon the private builder who would
utilize the development rights.” Richards, supra note 26, at 453.
41
These include, among others, the Special Midtown District, which imposes
a maximum FAR for certain zoning lots. See N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 81-211; the
Grand Central Subdistrict, which allows transfers to certain receiving lots without an
adjacency requirement and transfers of less than one FAR by certification (rather than
requiring a special permit), see id. §§ 81-63, 81-634; and the Theater Subdistrict, which
allows more distant transfers via a chain of lots under common ownership, see id. § 81747. The transfers allowed under Zoning Resolution section 81-747 are a special form of
landmark transfer and are permitted in the Theater Subdistrict, yet they are distinct
from the Special Theater Subdistrict TDR program. Id. Under section 81-747, transfers
can be made to more distant lots than permitted under the standard landmark TDR
program, but all intervening lots must be under common ownership. In addition, at
least one of the intervening lots must be occupied by a “listed theater[]” or by a use that
directly supports the theater business; a covenant must ensure either future use of this
type or an improvement to the lot to accommodate pedestrian or vehicular traffic
generated by theaters. Id.
42
John J. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of
Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 585 (1972) [hereinafter Costonis, The Chicago Plan].
43
Id. at 586-89.
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renders the landmark transfer program “useful only when a
developer can be found who happens to own a lot located across
a street or an intersection from a landmark . . . .”44 Developers
might also obtain more development rights through a zoning
lot merger than they can through a landmark transfer, because
the latter limits the increase in floor area obtainable through
TDRs (except for transfers in high density commercial districts)
to twenty percent of the receiving site’s existing FAR.45 Echoing
these concerns, an American Planning Association publication
from 1987 noted that in the eighteen years since the creation of
New York City’s landmark TDR program, only approximately a
dozen transfers occurred.46 The authors attributed this to
developers’ access to easier and more attractive methods for
increasing density, including zoning lot mergers and rezonings
of the development site.47 Indeed, the Furman Center’s research
on TDR transactions between 2003 and 2011 identified only
two transfers through the program during that period.48
C.

Special Transfer Districts

In addition to zoning lot mergers and landmark
transfers, New York City has a number of special districts that
permit more distant transfers of development rights. These
districts are defined geographic areas where specified granting
sites are able to transfer development rights to a number of
eligible receiving lots. The eligible receiving sites are not
limited to lots on the same block or even across the street from
the granting site; indeed, eligible receiving sites may be many
blocks away from a granting site. Hence these programs
potentially expand the market for both potential sellers and
buyers of TDRs.
These special transfer districts include, most notably, the
South Street Seaport Subdistrict,49 the Theater Subdistrict,50 the
44

Id. at 586-87.
N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 74-792(b)(4).
46
RICHARD J. RODDEWIG & CHERYL A. INGHRAM, AM. PLANNING ASS’N,
TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAMS: TDRS AND THE REAL ESTATE
MARKETPLACE 8 (1987); see also Richards, supra note 26 at 462 (“[T]o this writer’s
knowledge, only a dozen [landmark] transfers have been processed in eighteen years . . . .”).
47
In conversations with the authors, developers have indicated that because
of the special permit requirement they simply do not consider it worthwhile to obtain
development rights through the landmark TDR program.
48
Vicki Been, John Infranca & Josiah Madar, The Market for TDRs in New York
City 18-19 (May 25, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
49
N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 91-60.
50
Id. § 81-70.
45
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Special West Chelsea District,51 and the Special Hudson Yards
District.52 The Special Hudson Yards District, which includes a
complex TDR program,53 is an important component of the city’s
efforts to encourage development on the west side of Midtown
Manhattan.54 The city recently announced plans for a proposed
rezoning of East Midtown, which would also include a complex
TDR program.55 We discuss several of the special districts below
in order to explain how the districts operate and demonstrate
the evolving uses of TDRs.
1. Theater Subdistrict
The Theater Subdistrict, a part of the Special Midtown
District, permits the transfer of development rights from fortysix “listed theaters,” which are named in the Zoning Resolution
and include some that are also designated landmarks.56 With a
few exceptions, the listed theaters may transfer development
rights to any other lot within the Theater Subdistrict.57 To
execute a transfer, the City Planning Commission must issue
either a certification or an authorization, and the owner of the
granting site must provide written assurances that the site will
continue to be used as a legitimate theater.58 The theater also
must be certified as physically and operationally sound, or a
plan must be in place to upgrade it as necessary for its
continued use.59 Transfer through certification, which is a
ministerial process, may increase the maximum floor area at a
receiving site by no more than twenty percent.60 These transfers
also require a contribution to the Theater Subdistrict Fund,
51

Id. § 98-00.
Id. § 93-00.
53
See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
54
See East Midtown Study: Overview, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/east_midtown/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 10,
2012) [hereinafter East Midtown Study].
55
See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
56
N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 81-742 (providing list of theaters); see also
Kruse, supra note 16, at 110-11 (noting that some listed theaters are also landmarks).
57
N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 81-744.
58
Id. § 81-743.
59
Id.
60
Id. § 81-744(a); see also Kruse, supra note 16, at 115-16 (“[T]he only
requirement for such transfers beyond the FAR limit was that the [City Planning
Commission] confirm that (1) the TDRs available to the granting site be reduced once
the transfer is complete, (2) that the theater owner transferring the TDRs satisfy the
requirements regarding the continued use of the property as a legitimate theater, and
(3) that a contribution of ten dollars per square foot of transferred floor area be made to
the Theater Subdistrict Fund.”).
52
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which finances inspection and maintenance of the granting
theaters.61 Additionally, receiving sites within the Eighth
Avenue Corridor may use TDRs to gain an additional twenty
percent of FAR over the amount they can receive through
certification, subject to the City Planning Commission’s
authorization of the additional FAR.62 This authorization is
discretionary and requires findings that the development (i)
relates harmoniously to all structures and open space in its
vicinity in terms of scale, location, and access to light and air in
the area; and (ii) serves to enhance or reinforce the general
purposes of the Theater Subdistrict.63 To date, eleven transfers
have occurred through the Special Theater Subdistrict TDR
program,64 which have involved approximately 450,000 square
feet of development rights.
2. Special West Chelsea District
The Special West Chelsea District, which contains the
High Line, includes a sophisticated TDR program. The High
Line opened to rail traffic in 1933, replacing existing at-grade
train tracks.65 It ran “through the middle of the block between
10th and 11th Avenues, passing either over or through the
structures along the way, making deliveries of raw materials,
milk and meat directly into warehouses or factories that were
built to allow a train to run through them.”66 As the use of rail
declined in the post-war period, the High Line fell into disuse
and carried its last train in 1980.67 In the ensuing years, nature
reclaimed the elevated tracks, as wildflowers and grasses grew
amid its decaying structure.68 At the same time, the
surrounding neighborhood grew in popularity, becoming home
to nightclubs, art galleries, and restaurants.69
61

N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 81-744(a). The contribution amount is
adjusted over time, and the rate was adjusted in 2006 to $14.91 per square foot
transferred. Id. § 81-744.
62
Id. § 81-744(b). Because this twenty percent increase also applies to the
twenty percent obtained by certification, this allows for a total increase of forty-four
percent above the original FAR at the site. Id.
63
Id.
64
Been, Infranca & Madar, supra note 48, at 18-19.
65
Jackson, supra note 1.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Editorial, A Plan for the High Line, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2004, at CY.9,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/15/opinion/opinionspecial/highline.html.
69
See About: Neighborhood Info, HIGH LINE, http://thehighline.org/about/
neighborhood-info (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
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In the 1990s, owners of property beneath the elevated
rails sought to demolish the High Line structure, which would
have enabled them to redevelop their land.70 Then-Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani supported these efforts, but a lawsuit
prevented the city from demolishing the High Line before he
left office.71 After Michael Bloomberg was elected mayor in
2001, the city began to support efforts by a group known as
Friends of the High Line to transform the structure into an
urban park.72 The property owners below the High Line
withdrew their opposition in 2004 and in 2005 the federal
Surface Transportation Board issued a “certificate of interim
trail use,” permitting the tracks to be removed from the
national railway grid and enabling the process of transforming
it into a park to begin.73
The neighborhood around the High Line soon became
popular among developers,74 who recognized the High Line’s
potential as a unique urban amenity.75 In the next few years,
investors poured an estimated $2 billion into the area
surrounding the park.76 Although development in the area
slowed following the downturn in the broader real estate market,
the market remained strong compared to other neighborhoods.77

70

Paul Vitello, Rusty Railroad Advances on Road to Pristine Park, N.Y.
TIMES (June 15, 2005), http://travel.nytimes.com/2005/06/15/nyregion/15highline.html.
71
Adam Sternbergh, The High Line: It Brings Good Things to Life, N.Y.
MAG., Apr. 29, 2007, available at http://nymag.com/news/features/31273/.
72
Vitello, supra note 70.
73
Id.
74
Nicolai Ouroussoff, On the High Line, Solitude is Pretty Crowded, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/24/arts/design/
24ouro.html (“[T]he High Line risks being devoured by a string of developments,
including a dozen or more luxury towers, a new branch of the Whitney Museum of
American Art and a Standard Hotel.”).
75
See Kate Taylor, The High Line, a Pioneer Aloft, Inspires Other Cities to
Look Up, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, at A1 (“Part of the fascination with the High Line,
which is operated by the city and the nonprofit Friends group, is that it is more than
just a pretty place. The neighborhoods it runs through—the meatpacking district and
Chelsea—were already glamorous with many restaurants, bars and art galleries. But the
opening of the High Line has made those areas even more of a destination and encouraged
the Whitney Museum of American Art to build a museum there.”); Claire Wilson, Turning
the High Line into . . . the High Life, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/18/realestate/18cover.html?pagewanted=all (describing
the High Line as “[w]hat some say amounts to Manhattan’s biggest land grab since a
handful of Native Americans took a few beads in trade for the entire borough . . . .”).
76
Patrick McGeehan, The High Line Isn’t Just a Sight to See; It’s Also an
Economic Dynamo, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2011, at A18.
77
Alison Gregor, In Signs of New Life, Property Deals Below as a Park Runs
Above, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, at B6.
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According to owners of real estate along the High Line, the park
had a clearly positive impact on property values.78
The regulations that govern the Special West Chelsea
District restrict development of properties under and
immediately west of the High Line.79 These properties form a
“High Line Transfer Corridor” and property owners within this
“corridor” are authorized to transfer their TDRs.80 The district
is then further divided into designated subareas, and some of
these subareas are eligible receiving sites for TDRs. The TDRs
enable receiving sites to increase their FAR by between 1.0 and
2.65 FAR, depending upon the subarea.81 In certain subareas,
developers may also obtain additional FAR by contributing to a
High Line Improvement Fund or by participating in New York
City’s Inclusionary Housing Program.82
Various other regulations encourage transfers and help
to finance the development of the High Line. For example,
certain lots must dedicate an easement for an elevator or
stairwell that will provide access to the High Line in order to
transfer TDRs.83 Moreover, owners of vacant sites within the
High Line Transfer Corridor that have already transferred all
of their development rights may be granted an additional 1.0
FAR upon contribution of $50 per square foot to the High Line
Improvement Fund.84 The additional FAR, however, can only be
used for a commercial purpose within the High Line Transfer
Corridor. These provisions facilitate the Special West Chelsea
District’s broader goals of establishing the High Line as a
vibrant and accessible neighborhood resource.85 But they also
increase the potential costs of transferring development rights.
Perhaps as a result, prospective purchasers have complained
that too few TDRs are available for sale, that sellers initially

78

Id.
N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 98-11, 98-52 (2012).
80
Id. § 98-31. To execute a transfer, owners of the granting and receiving sites
must provide written notification to the Department of City Planning. Id. § 98-33(a).
81
Id. § 98-22 (providing table that sets forth maximum FAR in subareas). In
some of the subareas, a developer may obtain additional FAR via inclusionary housing
only after she has obtained the maximum allowable TDRs. This requirement further
incentivizes the purchase of TDRs. In certain areas, a developer must both purchase
TDRs and develop inclusionary housing to reach the maximum permitted FAR. Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. §§ 98-33(d), 98-62.
84
Id. § 98-35.
85
Id. § 98-00.
79
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priced their TDRs too high, and that the program’s regulations
should allow easier transfers.86
Despite these complaints, the Furman Center’s citywide
study of TDRs87 found records of seventeen transfers through
the Special West Chelsea District program between 2003 and
2011. These transfers reallocated approximately 273,000
square feet of development rights.88 Of the forty eligible grantor
lots in the High Line Transfer Corridor, thirty-three appear to
have had unused development rights when the program was
created and thirteen of these have transferred TDRs.89 The
individual transactions ranged in size from 643 square feet to
55,991 square feet of transferred development rights. During
the same period, 157,809 square feet of development rights
were transferred through eight zoning lot mergers in the area.
Some of these same development rights were later transferred
again through the special district TDR program.
Figure 2 below depicts the TDR transactions that have
occurred through the Special West Chelsea District program.
These transfers have shifted unused bulk from under the High
Line to specific blocks where the city seeks to encourage
development—most notably at the northern end of the district.
These northern blocks include the subareas with the highest
permitted maximum FAR.

86

See Eliot Brown, Developers Want Easier Access to High Line Air Rights;
But Should City Fix Something that Doesn’t Look Broken?, N.Y. OBSERVER (Feb. 13,
2008), http://www.observer.com/2008/developers-want-easier-access-high-line-air-rightsshould-city-fix-something-doesn-t-look-broke (“The Real Estate Board of New York,
responding to the concerns of multiple developers who were unable to find air rights to
buy, has asked the city to consider changes to zoning regulations in West Chelsea that
would allow for an easier transfer of those rights.”); Gregor, supra note 77.
87
See Been, Infranca & Madar, supra note 48, at 18-19.
88
This represents more than one-third of the approximately 765,000 square
feet of development rights that we estimate are available for transfer from the eligible
granting sites. Authors’ conversation with N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning (Oct. 2012).
89
The thirteen lots that participated are owned by only six parties. In
addition, only nine parties purchased TDRs. Six of the transfers were for a single
project, the Avalon West Chelsea, on Block 700. This project used a total of 111,000
square feet of TDRs.
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Figure 2: Development rights transfers in the Special West Chelsea
District90

3. The Special Hudson Yards District
The Special Hudson Yards District, located on the west
side of midtown Manhattan, includes a TDR program designed
to shape development in specific locations as well as to obtain
land for a planned public boulevard and park. To compensate
for restrictions on new development in the area planned for the
park, known as “Phase 2 Hudson Boulevard and Park,” the
private owners of property in this area may transfer unused
development rights by certification to designated subareas
within the district.91 The prices for these TDRs are determined
through private negotiations. The designated receiving
subareas each have a maximum permitted FAR increase,92
which developers can unlock by purchasing TDRs or by

90

Compiled from Furman Center analysis of data from the New York City
Department of Finance’s Automated City Register Information System (ACRIS), the
New York City Department of City Planning’s PLUTO, and the Department of
Buildings. See Been, Infranca & Madar, supra note 48, at 16-18. The demolition permit
data included demolition permits issued between 2003 and 2010. The development
rights transfer data includes transactions between 2003 and 2011.
91
N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 93-32.
92
See id. §§ 93-21, 93-22 (providing tables specifying allowable FAR increase).
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contributing to the Hudson Yards District Improvement Fund
in order to receive a bonus.93
Purchasers who have “maximized their permitted floor
area” through either of these two methods may then purchase
additional development rights from the Eastern Rail Yard.94
The Eastern Rail Yard will make available at least 4.5 million
square feet of development rights, which can be transferred to
a subset of the receiving sites eligible for TDRs from the Phase
2 grantor sites.95 A prospective purchaser must apply to
purchase these rights. A pricing policy issued in July 2010 set
the price at the higher of the current price for the District
Improvement Fund bonus or sixty percent of the value, per
square foot of land area, of the receiving property. However,
the pricing policy is currently being revised and a new policy is
scheduled for release in April 2013.96
While the specifics of these special district programs
differ, the basic elements remain the same: each seeks to
loosen the restrictions on the transfer of development rights
within the district in order to further the city’s goal of
encouraging development in the district’s other areas. Using
complex subdistrict rules, these newly created districts have
become increasingly sophisticated at directing the destination
and use of TDRs. These rules governing receiving areas look
more like traditional upzonings—albeit using private rather
than publicly created rights—than attempts to give property
owners more flexibility within the neighborhood.

93

Id. § 93-31. The fund will be used to finance infrastructure improvements
including extension of the subway and new parks and open space. See The Hudson Yards
Project: Rezoning, HUDSON YARDS DEV. CORP., http://www.hydc.org/html/project/
rezoning.shtml (last visited July 17, 2012) [hereinafter Hudson Yards Project: Rezoning].
94
N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 93-34.
95
See Hudson Yards Project: Rezoning, supra note 93.
96
See id. To facilitate the broad Hudson Yards redevelopment, New York
City created the Hudson Yards Infrastructure Corporation (HYIC) and Hudson Yards
Development Corporation (HYDC). See About HYDC, HUDSON YARDS DEV. CORP.,
http://www.hydc.org/html/about/about.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2012); Mission
Statement and Performance Measures, HUDSON YARDS INFRASTRUCTURE CORP.,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/hyic/html/about/hyic.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2012). HYIC
acquired a fifty percent share in the TDRs at the Eastern Rail Yards for $200 million,
which HYIC will recoup through the sale of the TDRs. See HYIC, FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS, YEARS ENDED JUNE 30, 2011 AND 2010, at 3-4, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/hyic/downloads/pdf/hyic_financial_statements_2011.pdf.
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4. The Proposed East Midtown Rezoning
The Bloomberg administration recently proposed a
rezoning of seventy-eight blocks in East Midtown in an area
surrounding Grand Central Terminal.97 The proposed rezoning
seeks to encourage development of more modern office
buildings in the area, where the average office building is over
seventy years old. When presenting its proposal, the
Department of City Planning noted the “limited success” of the
Grand Central Subdistrict, which was created in 1992 to allow
for easier transfer of landmark development rights in the area.
Only one major transfer has occurred through that program
since its creation, leaving over a million square feet of
development rights on the site of Grand Central Terminal.98
Rather than simply upzone the sites where greater
density will be allowed, the proposal—as described when this
article went to press—will permit owners of those sites to
increase maximum FAR as of right. First, owners can receive a
bonus in exchange for a contribution to the district
improvement fund,99 which is dedicated to improving
pedestrian networks and access to subway stations in the area.
Second, owners can further increase the FAR at a site by
purchasing landmark TDRs or making an additional
contribution to the fund.100 A special permit process will allow
even greater increases in FAR. This process will involve a full

97

East Midtown Study, supra note 54. The proposal was first mentioned,
albeit briefly, in Mayor Bloomberg’s 2012 State of the City address. See Matt Chaban,
The Mayor’s Very Big Plans for Midtown East, N.Y. OBSERVER (Jan. 16, 2012, 3:18
PM), available at http://observer.com/2012/01/the-mayors-very-big-plans-for-midtowneast/. In January 2013 the city updated the East Midtown Study presentation. See N.Y.C.
DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, EAST MIDTOWN STUDY: UPDATE PRESENTATION (Jan. 29, 2013),
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/east_midtown/presentation_012913.pdf.
This updated proposal did not alter the structure of the TDR program, but did shrink
the boundaries of the rezoning slightly, removing portions of three blocks from the
proposed rezoning. Id. at 15.
98
See East Midtown Study, supra note 54.
99
As of February 2013, the Department of City Planning was recommending
that this contribution rate be set at $250 per square foot of development rights. N.Y.C.
DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, EAST MIDTOWN STUDY: UPDATE PRESENTATION II, at 22 (Feb. 28,
2013), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/east_midtown/presentation_022813.pdf.
100
See Matt Chaban, Actually Developers and the City Are Not Competing for
Midtown East Development Rights, N.Y. OBSERVER (July 18, 2012, 5:52 PM),
http://observer.com/2012/07/actually-developers-and-the-city-are-not-competing-formidtown-east-development-rights/; Steve Cuozzo, Grand Central’s Grand Plan, N.Y.
POST (July 17, 2012, 12:50 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/realestate/
commercial/grand_central_grand_plan_jPGVKtolNBn7V8YYokal4N/0; see also East
Midtown Study, supra note 54.
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Uniform Land Use Review Process (ULURP),101 a design review,
and the developer’s agreement to create a major public space.102
II.

THE ORIGINAL CONCEPTION OF TRANSFERABLE
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

New York City’s existing TDR programs owe many of
their features to the legal and conceptual frameworks
developed in the 1970s and 1980s by legal scholars John
Costonis,103 Norman Marcus,104 and David Alan Richards.105
Those scholars viewed TDR programs as a tool to help resolve
tensions between development and preservation goals. But,
more broadly, they viewed them as part of a general move
toward more flexible zoning. They also seemed to view unused
development potential as a community resource, rather than as
a solely private one—an idea that shaped their proposals for
how municipalities could structure the transfer of development
rights. Because their views were so fundamental to the design
of TDR programs in New York City and across the country, this
part explores these theoretical frameworks and considers how
New York City’s existing TDR programs reflect their ideas.
A.

The Need for Transfer Districts to Correct the Perceived
Failure of Landmark TDRs

The desire to preserve resources—such as historic
landmarks, open space, and farmland—in areas facing
development pressure has been the principal motivation for
TDR proposals both in New York City and elsewhere. TDRs
have been used to alleviate the hardships that development
restrictions used to preserve those resources impose on their
owners.106 Mitigating or offsetting regulatory burdens is a
101

For a description of ULURP, see N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, THE UNIFORM
LAND USE REVIEW PROCEDURE (ULURP), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/luproc/
ulpro.shtml (Oct. 16, 2012) [hereinafter UNIFORM LAND USE REVIEW PROCEDURE].
102
East Midtown Study, supra note 54.
103
See JOHN J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT: SAVING URBAN LANDMARKS
THROUGH THE CHICAGO PLAN (1974); Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 42; John
J. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75
(1973) [hereinafter Costonis, Development Rights Transfer].
104
See Marcus, supra note 12; Marcus, supra note 30; Norman Marcus, Air
Rights Transfer in New York City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 372 (1971).
105
See Richards, supra note 26; Development Rights, supra note 21.
106
See supra note 29 and accompanying text. TDRs also have been advocated
as a method for alleviating broader inequities attributed to the vagaries of zoning. On
this account, Euclidean zoning and land use regulation can impose differing
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particularly important goal of the landmark and Theater
Subdistrict TDR programs. At the same time, the perceived
shortcomings of New York City’s landmark TDR program
motivated the development of more complex TDR programs.
Writing in 1972, John Costonis noted that no developers had
made use of the landmark TDR program adopted four years
earlier.107 He ascribed the program’s disuse to “[i]nadequate
analysis of the economic burdens of landmark ownership and of
the urban design consequences of development rights
transfers . . . ,” “[o]nerous administrative controls of dubious
necessity . . . ,” and prospective program participants’ skepticism
over the program’s legality.108 Costonis attributed the landmark
TDR program’s “failure” primarily to its adjacency requirement.109
In response to these perceived deficiencies, Costonis
proposed a “Chicago Plan,” which would preserve urban
landmarks through designation of “a ‘development rights
transfer district,’ an area within which the unused
development rights of landmark sites could be transferred.”110
The district would include recipient sites sufficiently close to
the transferor landmarks to enable the low-density landmarks
to offset the increased density at recipient sites. The district
would also encompass an area with a high concentration of
public services, enabling it to adequately absorb increased
population and density.111 Costonis described the Chicago Plan
as “an instance of density zoning, which prescribes a maximum
restrictions on landowners with similar parcels, providing economic benefits to some
while preventing economic gain by others. See Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer et al.,
Transferable Development Rights and Alternatives After Suitum, 30 URB. LAW. 441, 444
(1998); see also Miller, supra note 16, at 465 (arguing that TDRs, “by providing
compensation to landowners whose land value is severely decreased by zoning
regulation . . . . are simultaneously more equitable and more efficient than traditional
zoning practices”).
107
Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 42, at 577-78.
108
Id. at 578.
109
Id. at 594 (“It severely impairs the marketability of development rights. It
scatters density throughout the city on the capricious principle of how closely proposed
developments border on landmarks.”).
110
Costonis, Development Rights Transfer, supra note 103, at 86; see also
Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 42, at 590. Landmark owners within these
districts would be allowed to transfer development rights to any other lot within the
district, but they could only increase the development capacity at a receiving lot by a
maximum of fifteen percent. See Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 42, at 590.
Transfers would be accompanied by a requirement that landmark owners maintain the
landmark in the future. Id. Costonis notes that the fifteen percent figure “was
concurred in by municipal planners and architects in Chicago who viewed it as low
enough to protect against the risk of urban design abuse, but not so low as to deprive
the plan of economic appeal for landmark owners.” Id. at 590 n.55.
111
Costonis, Development Rights Transfer, supra note 103, at 86.
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amount of bulk for an area as a whole and permits developers
to concentrate or disperse that density on individual lots within
the area in accordance with flexible site planning criteria.”112 He
analogized this approach to other forms of density zoning,
including cluster zoning or planned unit developments, and to
flexibility devices such as zoning bonuses.113 Each of these
devices maintains a constant level of overall density while
simultaneously permitting greater design flexibility.114 Marcus
also noted these similarities, contending that “[i]f a larger area
unit of control is acceptable for developments in single
ownership, it should be equally acceptable where ownership in
the larger area is fragmented.”115
Costonis’s Chicago Plan was never adopted, but New
York City’s special district TDR programs embrace the districtwide focus that his proposal embodied. The Theater Subdistrict
is most analogous to density zoning, as it allows the transfer of
TDRs from the grantor theaters to nearly any other lot within
the district’s boundaries. By allowing more distant transfers,
this feature provides prospective TDR grantors with a measure
of increased flexibility. The program, however, draws the
boundaries sufficiently narrowly to keep the transfers within
the same neighborhood, ensuring that the neighborhood where
additional development is allowed is in close proximity to the
lower density lot that granted the TDRs.
These special programs also address Costonis’s concern
that the landmark TDR program could result in the
“capricious” scattering of density around the city, based only on
the proximity of a proposed development to a source of TDRs.116
This is particularly true of the West Chelsea TDR program and
the Hudson Yards program, which allow the transfer of TDRs a
112

Id. at 89.
Id. at 89, 124; see also Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 42, at 62223 (“Virtually every major innovation in the land use field over the last fifteen years
[including density zoning, special development districts, and development rights
transfer districts] rejects the notion that individual lots must serve as the unit of
development control.”). Marcus similarly compares TDRs to other flexible zoning
mechanisms, including “large scale developments,” planned unit development, and
cluster development. See Marcus, supra note 30, at 108.
114
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES &
MATERIALS 329-31 (discussing cluster zoning and planned unit developments), 331-36
(discussing zoning bonuses) (3d ed. 2005).
115
Marcus, supra note 30, at 108 (“It could serve the same planning goal—
better development with greater zoning flexibility without increasing density. Perhaps
most important, the resulting zoning flexibility could provide the framework necessary
to sustain stringent public regulation of areas of critical concern to the environment,
such as major public resource areas.”).
116
Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 42, at 594.
113
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number of blocks away from the grantor site but place a firm
limit on the maximum amount of FAR that each eligible
receiving site may obtain. This limit differs depending upon the
subarea in which a given receiving site is located.117
B.

The Need to Move Away from Lot-by-Lot Development
Control

Although the increasing complexity of the city’s special
transfer districts has moved those districts away from the
original conception of district-wide density zoning, zoning lot
mergers continue to function as density zoning at a block level.
Norman Marcus argued that the choice of the individual lot as
the traditional unit of development control was arbitrary and
failed to serve public interests.118 Uniform controls on all lots
were imposed when growth, rather than preservation, was the
driving concern of planning. Their goal was “to promote equal
opportunity by treating large areas according to uniform
regulations.”119 The emphasis on lot-based zoning, he
maintained, could impose detrimental uniformity and
encourage landowners to develop sites that would better serve
society in other ways.120 He asserted that controls at the block
level can achieve density goals as readily as lot-level controls.121
Zoning lot mergers instantiate Marcus’s ideas by
moving away from lot-based zoning and permitting transfers
throughout a block. They provide greater flexibility and allow
private actors to negotiate the distribution of density within a
block.122 In fact, during the late 1970s, as Marcus and Costonis
117

See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
Marcus, supra note 30, at 108.
Id.
120
See id.
121
Marcus, supra note 12, at 878 n.40. Marcus did not express the same
concerns as Costonis regarding the landmark transfer program. He did, however, raise
concerns regarding the transfer of unused development rights from parcels spaced too
widely apart. See id. For example, he posited that a transfer between boroughs would
result in a TDR program “destroy[ing] any zoning plan within which it operates.” Id.
The concept of regulating density over a broader area, such as a block, is analogous to
the “bubble” concept in environmental regulation, which allows for polluters to freely
trade permits “allowing a given number of tons of a pollutant to be emitted or
discharged in a given air or water basin . . . .” Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of
Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 WIS. L. REV.
655, 684 (1985).
122
See supra Part I.A (discussing zoning lot mergers). Shifting density
controls from the lot level to the block level will not necessarily result in the same
overall density in the area subject to regulation. Rather than simply shift the location
of development that would otherwise occur, TDRs have the potential to encourage
greater actual built density than might occur were transfers not allowed. Richards, supra
118
119
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were writing on TDRs, New York City amended its zoning lot
merger process in a way that rendered it even more akin to
density zoning. The 1977 amendment to the Zoning Resolution
eliminated the requirement that a developer purchase or
obtain a seventy-five-year lease for any property from which
TDRs were obtained and thereby eased the transfer of density
among tax lots on a block.123
C.

Development Rights as a Community Resource

Costonis asserted that the technique of development
rights transfer “stands squarely upon a principle that has been
implicit in American land use practice since the Euclid decision:
The development potential of privately-held land represents, in
part, a community asset that government may allocate to
enhance the general welfare.”124 This position relies in significant
part on the premise that the government creates much of the
value in privately held land.125 TDRs, on this account, enable the
government to recoup some of this value for public use by
avoiding or discounting potential eminent domain awards.126
note 31, at 437; see also Arik Levinson, Why Oppose TDRs?: Transferable Development
Rights Can Increase Overall Development, 27 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 283, 293
(1997) (finding that, in a partial equilibrium model of urban zoning, “total development
under a TDR system would be higher than under a uniform height rule”). Of course this
should not be surprising, given that TDR programs are justified in part as a method for
giving value to development rights that would otherwise go unused.
123
See supra note 26. At the same time, under New York’s zoning lot merger
provision, development rights cannot be freely exchanged between any two lot owners
within a block. The granting and receiving lots must either be directly adjacent or they
must obtain the agreement of all intervening lots to enter into a single zoning lot
merger. If the city wished to grant even greater flexibility to owners of TDRs—moving
the zoning lot merger process closer to density zoning—it could remove the
requirement that intervening lots enter into a zoning lot merger. Instead, any two lots
on a block could be allowed to negotiate a transfer, which would include the placement
of a permanent restriction on the grantor lot equivalent to the amount of development
rights transferred. Such a change would remove the limited veto (and concomitant
strategic bargaining opportunities) afforded to intervening lots by the current zoning
lot merger process.
124
Costonis, Development Rights Transfer, supra note 103, at 85, 127 (“The
central argument advanced in this article is that the development potential of private
property is in part a community asset allocable to serve the community’s needs. As
implemented under development rights transfer this principle vastly expands
government’s economic and planning leverage over private land use decisions.
Concomitantly, it places the leadership and administrative burden for resource
protection more squarely on government’s shoulders.”).
125
See id. at 97-98.
126
Id. at 99 (“By regarding the development potential of private property as in
part a community resource, on the other hand, development rights transfer enables
government to share in the gains occasioned by rising land values. Eminent domain
awards paid to owners of protected resources will be discounted to eliminate windfalls
attributable to governmental rather than private initiative. Marginal downward revisions
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ARE NEW YORK CITY’S NEWEST TDR PROGRAMS POSTZONING?

What are planners, land use lawyers, and property
owners to make of New York City’s newer transferrable
development rights programs? Are they improving upon a
promising way of moving beyond the rigidities of traditional
zoning schemes, or are they burdening what could have been a
more flexible scheme with the same complexities and
restrictions that mark traditional zoning ordinances? The
answers to these questions will vary somewhat depending on the
TDR program one considers.
This final part seeks to identify a few key themes
reflected in the city’s evolving use of TDRs. First, the complex
subdistricting threatens to undermine the flexibility that TDRs
promised. Second, narrower definitions and greater restrictions
on receiving sites have a number of potential virtues: they may
promote more careful planning of a district’s future
development, allow more transparent public review of potential
future development sites, provide greater predictability
regarding the location and intensity of as-of-right development;
and serve to standardize the exactions imposed upon
purchasers. Third, these TDR programs cast new light on longstanding controversies regarding the value of TDRs and their
role in providing compensation for development restrictions.127
The newer programs establish a limited number of receiving
sites within larger areas typically marked by development

in the development potential of lands within transfer districts will afford the funds
required by these awards; these revisions will be proportioned to what land economists
have long regarded as the ‘unearned increment’ in the value of private property.”).
127
In Penn Central, Justice Brennan considered TDRs relevant to the
question of a regulation’s impact and whether it constituted a taking. 438 U.S. 104, 137
(1978). In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected this view, arguing that TDRs were
only of relevance to the question of compensation. Id. at 150 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). This debate continued at the Court in Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997). There, the petitioner property owner challenged
development restrictions that included the grant of “certain allegedly valuable
‘Transferable Development Rights.’” Id. at 728. Focusing on the claim’s ripeness, a
majority of the Court declined to address the relevance of TDRs to the issues of
whether a taking had occurred or whether just compensation had been provided. Id. In
a concurrence, Justice Scalia staked the position that TDRs have no relevance to the
takings question (and whether the claim is therefore ripe for judicial review) but
instead simply constituted a form of compensation and should be considered in that
light. Id. at 747-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Accordingly, Scalia deemed irrelevant the majority’s discussion of whether the
defendant had reached a final decision on the salability of the TDRs and “whether
[their] value . . . must be known.” Id. at 745.
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pressure and a demand for increased density. They then
require potential developers who seek to achieve maximum
permitted FAR to purchase TDRs on the private market. In so
doing, these regulations strengthen the market for these TDRs
and better ensure that they have a reasonable value. In this
final part we explore each of these points in turn.
A.

Newer TDR Programs May Be Too Rigid and Complex to
Qualify as Flexible “Post-Zoning”

TDRs allow property owners to avoid the strictures of
existing zoning by buying TDRs on the private market rather
than seeking regulatory changes that would allow greater
density on the site. Although the landmark TDR program
imposes special permitting requirements on the transfers, the
more recent special district programs allow many transfers to
be made as of right. This less onerous process is coupled,
however, with specifications that limit the volume and
destination of development rights.
The Special West Chelsea District, for example, allows
transfers as of right, requiring only that parties submit a
written notice of intent to transfer. However, the West Chelsea
District also identified specific sites to which these rights could
be transferred and placed limits on the number of TDRs a
receiving site could obtain. These limits are tailored to foster
an urban form that accords with the general purposes of the
district, which include “ensur[ing] that the form and use of new
buildings relates to and enhances neighborhood character and
the High Line open space” and “creat[ing] and provid[ing] a
transition to the lower-scale Chelsea Historic District.”128
Accordingly, although private-market actors are provided some
flexibility with regard to where TDRs may be moved, this
freedom is carefully circumscribed within a detailed plan for
the receiving sites. In some ways, the Special Theater
Subdistrict, which allows an initial as-of-right transfer to any
site within a broad geographic area, is more akin to density
zoning than the Special West Chelsea District.129 However,
unlike the Special West Chelsea District, a special permit is
still required for a purchaser to obtain the maximum permitted
FAR increase at a development site.

128
129

N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 98-00(e)-(f) (2012).
See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
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Unlike earlier forms of TDRs, including the zoning lot
merger and to some extent the Special Theater Subdistrict, the
newer programs—particularly West Chelsea and Hudson
Yards—are more than a form of density zoning that creates a
space where developers can freely select the location and
intensity of development. Instead, these programs more carefully
direct the form and intensity of permissible development in a
way that reflects the goals (and structure) of more traditional
zoning. In this sense TDRs have moved away from a simple
mechanism that permits buyers to escape the strictures of
existing zoning and toward a complex system of upzonings (and
downzonings), where the right to develop to the maximum
permitted FAR depends upon the use of TDRs purchased on
the private market.130
B.

The More Rigid Regulation of Eligible Receiving Sites
May Provide Advantages

Although zoning lot mergers do not alter the total density
on a block, they leave uncertain precisely where permitted
density will be situated within a block. Similarly, the Theater
TDR program allowed development rights to be transferred
anywhere within the Theater Subdistrict, although it limited the
permissible increase in FAR at a receiving site. This left the
likelihood of increased density at any specific site highly
uncertain, which may have affected the likelihood that neighbors
would oppose the program.131 Newer TDR programs, by specifying
both the parcels that can receive TDRs and the amount of FAR
they can obtain, more carefully constrict the permitted density at
a parcel. In so doing, they promote greater predictability.132

130

As noted above, under the proposed East Midtown rezoning, a developer
can receive additional FAR first through a contribution to a district improvement fund.
A developer can then gain additional FAR through the purchase of TDRs or through an
additional contribution to the district improvement fund. See supra note 100 and
accompanying text.
131
This uncertainty most likely reduced opposition. However, it may be that
the uncertainty over where the TDRs would be deployed increased the likelihood of
neighborhood opposition because every resident or owner had to worry that the lot next
door would receive the TDRs. Generally speaking, however, the greater the certainty of
denser development nearby, the greater the likelihood that neighbors will oppose
whatever tool is providing that density.
132
Norman Marcus argued for the importance of ensuring predictability when
structuring a TDR program. He emphasized the need to relate TDRs to a “wellconsidered plan” and rejected long-distance transfers of development rights due to
concerns about the potential negative impact on the “predictability and collective
security” that zoning provides. See Marcus, supra note 12; Norman Marcus,
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That predictability may affect the nature of the public’s
participation in debates over proposed TDR programs. Each
proposal triggers a public review process in which stakeholders
can present challenges to the proposed changes in allowable
density. By providing greater specificity about where the TDRs
may be used, the newer programs give stakeholders a clearer
understanding of what would be allowed and where.133 That
clarity likely encourages those property owners and residents
who live near areas designated as potential recipients of the
TDRs to participate actively in the public review. Of course,
these increases remain speculative and, to some extent, less
likely than they would be if the city were simply to upzone an
area (given that a developer must still find a willing seller of
TDRs). As such, allowing increased density through TDRs
rather than a simple upzoning may decrease the likelihood of
strong opposition to a proposal.
Like the TDR programs in the Special Theater, Special
Hudson Yards, and Special West Chelsea Districts, the East
Midtown proposal includes an improvement fund. Developers
contribute to these funds to either obtain the right to purchase
TDRs or to obtain additional development capacity in lieu of, or
in addition to, purchasing TDRs.134 These improvement funds
serve to further the goals of the special district by providing
infrastructure or other benefits. Essentially, these funds
operate as an exaction for developers.135 Rather than allowing it
to depend upon negotiations between a developer and the city,
however, the funds standardize this exaction. Some of the
programs also allow for an in-kind-contribution in place of a
monetary contribution. The Hudson Yards District, for example,
Transferable Development Rights: A Current Appraisal, 1 PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr.
1987, at 40, 42.
133
These programs are part of proposals that are subject to review through
the ULURP process, which includes a public hearing. See UNIFORM LAND USE REVIEW
PROCEDURE, supra note 101; see also N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning, West Chelsea
Zoning
Proposal,
NYC.GOV,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/westchelsea/
westchelsea3a.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2012) (noting city council approval of three
ULURP applications related to proposal); N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning, Hudson Yards
Original Proposal as Adopted, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/hyards/proposal.shtml
(last visited Oct. 16, 2012) (discussing ULURP applications).
134
See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 81-744(a)(5) (2012)
(discussing Theater Subdistrict Fund’s contribution requirement in conjunction with
transfer by certification); id. § 98-35(c) (discussing High Line Improvement Fund); id.
§ 98-262(c) (discussing increases in FAR in exchange for contributions to West Chelsea
Affordable Housing Fund).
135
See generally Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American
Land Use Regulation: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177 (2006)
(discussing history and evolving uses of exactions and development impact fees).
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accepts the improvement of a granting site as a public park in
lieu of a cash contribution.136 The High Line Improvement Fund
allows a property owner to reduce her contribution if she
provides structural remediation for the segment of the High
Line above her property.137 The TDR programs accordingly
regularize and standardize the price developers must pay to
offset the impacts their developments will have on the
community and again bring greater transparency to the process.
C.

Newer TDR Programs Have the Potential to Render
TDRs More Valuable

Finally, the newer programs strengthen the demand for
TDRs. The West Chelsea, Hudson Yards, and proposed East
Midtown programs are located in areas with significant demand
for new residential and commercial space. These TDR programs
operate in conjunction with broader policies that encourage and
channel this demand.138 In the High Line area, for instance, the
preservation of a unique urban resource has increased the area’s
desirability. To further encourage the purchase of TDRs by
certain recipient sites, the West Chelsea program requires
developers to purchase TDRs before they can obtain additional
FAR through the city’s inclusionary housing bonus program.139 In
Hudson Yards, the city will only allow a developer to purchase
TDRs from the Eastern Rail Yard after a private-market
purchase of TDRs from the designated grantor sites.140 Similarly,
the proposal for East Midtown will allow the largest sites to
pursue a special permit for additional FAR only after they have
already obtained the maximum FAR available through TDRs or
through a contribution to the designated improvement fund.141 In
contrast with the earlier zoning lot merger and landmark TDR
programs, these newer programs both increase the value of
TDRs to property owners burdened with restrictions and serve
to further very specific planning goals.

136

N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 93-32(b).
Id. § 98-25.
138
See supra Part I.C (discussing programs).
139
See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
140
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
141
See East Midtown Study, supra note 54; see also Matt Chaban, How About
Another Empire State Building or Two? City Outlines Mega Midtown East Rezoning,
N.Y. OBSERVER, July 12, 2012, http://observer.com/2012/07/how-about-another-empirestate-building-or-two-city-outlines-mega-midtown-east-rezoning/.
137
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CONCLUSION
New York City’s TDR programs have come a long way
from the zoning lot mergers that approximated block-level
density zoning. TDRs now play a starring role in some of the
city’s most ambitious rezonings. This enhanced role, however,
has been accompanied by careful restrictions on the sites that
can receive the transfers. The creative tool that enabled New
York City developers to seemingly escape restrictive zoning
and build towering structures like the Trump World Tower142
has been reined back into the confines of traditional zoning
principles. While the latest evolution of TDR programs has
advantages, the reduction in flexibility these newer programs
impose will likely render them ineligible for “post-zoning”
status, regardless of how that concept might be defined.

142

See Dunlap, supra note 27.

